Thucydides' legacy in grand strategy

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via the DOI in this record Thucydides is now a familiar name in the fields of politics, war, and strategy, but references to his work in discussions of grand strategy are usually superficial and sometimes problematic. He is treated as both ancient and modern, as an authoritative theorist whose views are then ignored in favor of the events of the war he described. This chapter explores the nature of Thucydides’ project, as a detailed narrative of past events that claims nevertheless to offer his readers a “possession for all time” as a guide to future developments. It surveys the various depictions of strategic thinking in his account, as presented in set-piece scenes of deliberation and debate—and explores how the broader narrative places the confident plans and expectations of war leaders, even Pericles, in question. His account emphasizes the absence of grand strategy in antiquity, above all the absence of the necessary institutional framework. It also raises important questions about the feasibility of any grand strategy, especially within a democracy, given the unpredictability of events and the poor track record of humans in anticipating them