A critical evaluation of the FBST ev for Bayesian hypothesis testing: Critique of the FBST ev

The “Full Bayesian Significance Test e-value”, henceforth FBST ev, has received increasing attention across a range of disciplines including psychology. We show that the FBST ev leads to four problems: (1) the FBST ev cannot quantify evidence in favor of a null hypothesis and therefore also cannot discriminate “evidence of absence” from “absence of evidence”; (2) the FBST ev is susceptible to sampling to a foregone conclusion; (3) the FBST ev violates the principle of predictive irrelevance, such that it is affected by data that are equally likely to occur under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis; (4) the FBST ev suffers from the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox in that it does not include a correction for selection. These problems also plague the frequentist p-value. We conclude that although the FBST ev may be an improvement over the p-value, it does not provide a reasonable measure of evidence against the null hypothesis