I study how incumbency affects future campaign funding in mayoral elections in Brazil. Utilizing a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect(s), I find that incumbency is associated with an increase in campaign donations of 20 percent. The effect is driven by higher self-funding among incumbents. They donate, on average, 294 percent more to their campaigns compared to the challengers. They also receive, on average, 78 percent less in party donations. Individual donations do not systematically differ between incumbents and challengers
High rerunning rates among incumbents and among the two major parties, allow studies of US incumbenc...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...
A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. ...
Several recently published studies analyze the effects of national conditional cash transfer (CCT) p...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
Several recently published studies analyze the effects of national conditional cash transfer (CCT) p...
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, the Brazilian government began to audit the municipal ...
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, the Brazilian government began to audit the municipal ...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political co...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from Brazil’s random-ized anti...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
High rerunning rates among incumbents and among the two major parties, allow studies of US incumbenc...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...
A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. ...
Several recently published studies analyze the effects of national conditional cash transfer (CCT) p...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
Several recently published studies analyze the effects of national conditional cash transfer (CCT) p...
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, the Brazilian government began to audit the municipal ...
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, the Brazilian government began to audit the municipal ...
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the...
We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political co...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from Brazil’s random-ized anti...
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports o...
High rerunning rates among incumbents and among the two major parties, allow studies of US incumbenc...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...
A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. ...