This book presents a modular framework for slicing in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL which is based on abstract control flow graphs. Building on such abstract structures renders the correctness results language-independent. To prove that they hold for a specific language, it remains to instantiate the framework with this language, which requires a formal semantics of this language in Isabelle/HOL. We show that formal semantics even for sophisticated high-level languages are realizable
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive the-orem prover Isabelle/HOL and deri...
We present a machine-checked correctness proof for information flow noninterference based on interpr...
AbstractThis paper presents a method for mechanically proving the soundness of a programming logic f...
This book presents a modular framework for slicing in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL which is base...
Abstract—We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover ...
We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/...
International audienceWe describe Chisel, a tool that synthesizes a program slicer directly from a g...
Modern programming languages offer a lot of guarantees (no or few memory leaks, safe parallel progra...
Abstract We introduce a generic framework for proof carrying code, developed and mechanically verifi...
Proof-producing program analysis augments the invariants inferred by an abstract interpreter with th...
Abstract. In the context of program verification, we propose a formal frame-work for proof slicing t...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL and deriv...
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But do...
Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information l...
This paper revisits the idea of slicing programs based on their axiomatic semantics, rather than usi...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive the-orem prover Isabelle/HOL and deri...
We present a machine-checked correctness proof for information flow noninterference based on interpr...
AbstractThis paper presents a method for mechanically proving the soundness of a programming logic f...
This book presents a modular framework for slicing in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL which is base...
Abstract—We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover ...
We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/...
International audienceWe describe Chisel, a tool that synthesizes a program slicer directly from a g...
Modern programming languages offer a lot of guarantees (no or few memory leaks, safe parallel progra...
Abstract We introduce a generic framework for proof carrying code, developed and mechanically verifi...
Proof-producing program analysis augments the invariants inferred by an abstract interpreter with th...
Abstract. In the context of program verification, we propose a formal frame-work for proof slicing t...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL and deriv...
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But do...
Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information l...
This paper revisits the idea of slicing programs based on their axiomatic semantics, rather than usi...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive the-orem prover Isabelle/HOL and deri...
We present a machine-checked correctness proof for information flow noninterference based on interpr...
AbstractThis paper presents a method for mechanically proving the soundness of a programming logic f...