Ordinary language philosophy: examining what we should say when

This thesis takes its cue from J.L. Austin (‘A Plea for Excuses’): philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language (OLP) is an exercise in ‘examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it’ (P F E: 129). It argues that the method of OLP (The Method) is properly understood when we view language through a Cavellian lens. Linguistic competence emerges not as tacit knowledge of a system of strict rules, but as a kind of skill: a fluid ability to leverage one’s attunement to others in order to make oneself understood. In light of this, The Method ought to be understood as a self-conscious deployment of this skill, an invitation to project our words into novel contexts. Such an invitation is illuminating, because it asks us to attend, carefully and critically, to the world, and to follow out the holistic conceptual connections revealed by our projection of a word into a given context. Because this attention is careful and critical, OLP need not be conservative; neither need The Method precipitate us into a gross relativism. Indeed, a vision of language based on attunement offers a realistic, and deeply sensitive, picture of what is involved in responsibly negotiating our differences