We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has "correlation neglect," i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is obser...
International audienceIn this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the qua...
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. a persuasion problem) with a single sender ...
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesian per...
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering informati...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver’s subsequent ...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
International audienceWe consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision...
We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability ...
We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate infor-mation through the media t...
In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increas-ing the n...
We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual proces...
We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed expe...
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is obser...
International audienceIn this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the qua...
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. a persuasion problem) with a single sender ...
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesian per...
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering informati...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver’s subsequent ...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
International audienceWe consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision...
We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability ...
We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate infor-mation through the media t...
In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increas-ing the n...
We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual proces...
We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed expe...
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is obser...
International audienceIn this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the qua...
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. a persuasion problem) with a single sender ...