Add to ORKGThis paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].Ce papier considère l'implémentation d'une allocation en information complète lorsque les détails stratégiques et informationnels sont spécifiés de manière partielle. Il est alors exigé que l'issue de décision de participation de tous les agents soit un équilibre en sous-jeux parfait pour une vaste gamme de ...
We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which th...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their in...
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel settin...
We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately inf...
Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on inde...
The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be av...
In this paper we define a bargaining solution for cooperative games with incomplete information. Our...
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcom...
Unité de localisation : UMR 1215 UMR INRA / Univ. Grenoble 2 : Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GRE20...
ABSTRACT We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings o...
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which th...
Following Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), economists have typically used aggregative games...
We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which th...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their in...
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel settin...
We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately inf...
Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on inde...
The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be av...
In this paper we define a bargaining solution for cooperative games with incomplete information. Our...
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcom...
Unité de localisation : UMR 1215 UMR INRA / Univ. Grenoble 2 : Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GRE20...
ABSTRACT We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings o...
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which th...
Following Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), economists have typically used aggregative games...
We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which th...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...