International audienceWe consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the target company. This leads to large inefficiency losses. For many configurations, expected target returns are first increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and o...
Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private-value auctions the optimal individ...
This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encour...
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compe...
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. ...
This paper characterizes how a target firm should be sold when the possible buyers (bidders) have p...
The substantial control premium in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target ...
Target firms often face a takeover threat from raiders with prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds...
This notes are meant as background for devising whether an acquisition of a target firm might lead t...
This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its owne...
Prior to the announcement of a tender offer, the bidding firm is legally allowed to acquire shares i...
We document empirical evidence that bidders tailor their takeover strategy when facing entrenched ta...
We evaluate empirically two sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resist...
Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed ...
This thesis presents an empirical investigation of the role of competition in determining (1) bidde...
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and o...
Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private-value auctions the optimal individ...
This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encour...
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compe...
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. ...
This paper characterizes how a target firm should be sold when the possible buyers (bidders) have p...
The substantial control premium in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target ...
Target firms often face a takeover threat from raiders with prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds...
This notes are meant as background for devising whether an acquisition of a target firm might lead t...
This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its owne...
Prior to the announcement of a tender offer, the bidding firm is legally allowed to acquire shares i...
We document empirical evidence that bidders tailor their takeover strategy when facing entrenched ta...
We evaluate empirically two sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resist...
Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed ...
This thesis presents an empirical investigation of the role of competition in determining (1) bidde...
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and o...
Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private-value auctions the optimal individ...
This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encour...