Detection and prevention of new attacks for ID-based authentication protocols

peer-reviewedThe rapid development of information and network technologies motivates the emergence of various new computing paradigms, such as distributed computing, and edge computing. This also enables more and more network enterprises to provide multiple different services simultaneously. To ensure these services can conveniently be accessed only by authorized users, many password and smart card-based authentication schemes for multi-server architecture have been proposed. In this paper, we review several dynamic ID-based password authentication schemes for multi-server environments. New attacks against four of these schemes are presented, demonstrating that an adversary can impersonate either legitimate or fictitious users. The impact of these attacks is the failure to achieve the main security requirement: authentication. Thus, the security of the analyzed schemes is proven to be compromised. We analyze these four dynamic ID-based schemes and discuss the reasons for the success of the new attacks. Additionally, we propose a new set of design guidelines to prevent such exploitable weaknesses on dynamic ID-based authentication protocols. Finally, we apply the proposed guidelines to the analyzed protocols and demonstrate that violation of these guidelines leads to insecure protocols