Add to ORKGWhy is further multilateral trade liberalisation proving so difficult to achieve? This paper shows that Article XXIV itself, the set of WTO rules governing trade block formation, undermines the multilateral liberalisation process. Trade block formation under Article XXIV can be thought of as a coalition formation game with negative externalities. We suppose that the usual mechanism through which block formation exerts a negative externality on non-members - a rise in external tariffs - is precluded by Article XXIV. But essentially the same effect is created by internal tariff reduction. From this it follows that free trade is not an equilibrium
In a game of endogenous trade agreements, we examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (F...
In the economic model that underlies the WTO the only group that can be expected to ask for protecti...
Abstract: There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multil...
This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
Post-print draft dated July 25, 2012. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http...
This paper shows that the WTO’s Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
This paper shows that free trade can never be achieved when punishment for deviation from a trade ag...
There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multilateral eff...
This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
The previous version of the paper has circulated under the title: "Does free trade benefit all?"Alth...
Using an endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model under all possible multilater...
This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, ea...
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to seq...
This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system m...
Preferential trade agreement (PTA) members have to eliminate internal tariffs with each other but ar...
In a game of endogenous trade agreements, we examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (F...
In the economic model that underlies the WTO the only group that can be expected to ask for protecti...
Abstract: There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multil...
This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
Post-print draft dated July 25, 2012. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http...
This paper shows that the WTO’s Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
This paper shows that free trade can never be achieved when punishment for deviation from a trade ag...
There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multilateral eff...
This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen ...
The previous version of the paper has circulated under the title: "Does free trade benefit all?"Alth...
Using an endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model under all possible multilater...
This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, ea...
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to seq...
This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system m...
Preferential trade agreement (PTA) members have to eliminate internal tariffs with each other but ar...
In a game of endogenous trade agreements, we examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (F...
In the economic model that underlies the WTO the only group that can be expected to ask for protecti...
Abstract: There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multil...