La omisión impropia en los delitos de prevaricación administrativa

Considering the typical description of transgression contained in the Penal Code in which the verb “to dictate” a resolution refers to an active behavior, it is understandable that, at the doctrinal level, the acceptance of a omissive prevarication has been a controversial issue. In this article, in addition to accepting such criminal activity, we will try to confront and solve the problems arising from the admission of omissive prevarication, but conditioned to concurrence with an alleged administrative decision, appearing in legal matters according to the rules of administrative silence. This conditioning is seen in some Supreme Court judgments and, in some way, in some doctrinal opinions to which we shall refer.[Segundo accésit. Premios de artículos jurídicos «GARCÍA GOYENA» (Curso 2014-2015)]Teniendo en cuenta la descripción típica de la prevaricación contenida en el Código Penal, en tanto el verbo “dictar” una resolución hace referencia a un comportamiento activo, es explicable que, a nivel doctrinal, la admisión de una prevaricación omisiva haya sido un tema controvertido. En este trabajo, además de admitir tal modalidad delictiva, se intenta enfrentar y dar solución a los problemas que puede plantear la admisión de la forma omisiva pero condicionada a la concurrencia de una resolución administrativa presunta, emergida al tráfico jurídico de acuerdo con las reglas del silencio administrativo. Este condicionamiento se vislumbra en algunas Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo y, de alguna forma, en ciertas opiniones doctrinales a las que tendremos ocasión de referirnos.Considering the typical description of transgression contained in the Penal Code in which the verb “to dictate” a resolution refers to an active behavior, it is understandable that, at the doctrinal level, the acceptance of a omissive prevarication has been a controversial issue. In this article, in addition to accepting such criminal activity, we will try to confront and solve the problems arising from the admission of omissive prevarication, but conditioned to concurrence with an alleged administrative decision, appearing in legal matters according to the rules of administrative silence. This conditioning is seen in some Supreme Court judgments and, in some way, in some doctrinal opinions to which we shall refer