La revocatoria de mandato en Colombia: diseño institucional y resultados de su aplicación

Abstract:Since the 90s, after the crisis of the mass representation model characteristic of the Welfare States, and the arrival of the so-called audience democracy, typical of the States of the Global Era, several Latin American countries undertook constitutional reforms in which, among other changes, incorporated citizen participation and control mechanisms associated with participatory and direct conceptions of democracy, such as: the popular initiative, the popular consultation, the participatory budget and the recall, among others. This last tool of vertical societal accountability allows the citizens to dismiss the representatives elected by them through the vote in a referendum, which is called after their promoters have managed to gather the minimum number of signatures required to carry out the initiative. Colombia incorporated it in its 1991 Constitution, but only to dismiss governors and mayors. That is, executive authorities at the subnational level, thus excluding the president and legislators at all levels. In 1994 two laws regulated its exercise: law number 131 and 134. In the years 2002 and 2015, modifications were approved tending to diminish its requirements: law number 741 and 1.757, respectively. However, having submitted numerous applications in its more than 20 years of validity, no ruler was revoked until now. This article focuses on analyzing, first, the institutional design of the recall in Colombia, to determine if it has tended to facilitate or hinder its use by the population. In the same sense, the successive modifications carried out through the aforementioned laws were studied, which were aimed at reducing key requirements such as: the number of signatures needed to accompany the request, the minimum participation required in the referendum to validate the vote, the number of votes needed to dismiss the president, among others. Likewise, the empirical performance of this tool is studied during the period 1997-2015. The results obtained indicate that, despite the regulatory reforms that progressively reduced their implementation requirements, and having submitted numerous requests, no agent was revoked. Among its causes is identified the political incentive that the replacement of the revoked rulers via elections implies for its opponents interested in arriving in advance to power. However, the electoral political use of this mechanism, at the hands of former and future candidates for office, has not been accompanied at the polls with sufficient popular support to reach the minimum adhesions required for the revocation. In this way, the recall in Colombia would work less as a mechanism of citizen control than as an instrument of intra-elite political dispute.Resumen:Desde los años 90, tras la crisis del modelo de representación de masas característico de los Estados de Bienestar y el arribo de la llamada democracia de audiencia, propia de los Estados de la Era Global, varios paísesde América Latina emprendieron reformas constitucionales en las que, entre otros cambios, incorporaron mecanismos de participación y control ciudadano asociados a las concepciones participativa y directa de democracia, como ser: la iniciativa popular, la consulta popular, el presupuesto participativo y la revocatoria de mandato, entre otros. Esta última herramienta de accountability societal vertical permite a los ciudadanos destituir a los representantes por elloselegidos a través del voto en un referéndum, el que es convocado luego de que sus promotores hayan logrado reunir la cantidad de firmas mínimas requeridas para dar curso a la iniciativa popular de solicitud. Colombia la incorporó en su Constitución de 1991, pero solo para destituir a gobernadores y alcaldes. Es decir, autoridades ejecutivas del nivel subnacional, excluyendo por tanto al presidente y a los legisladores de todos los niveles. En el año 1994 dos leyes reglamentaron su ejercicio: la ley número 131 y la 134. En los años 2002 y 2015 se aprobaron modificaciones tendientes a disminuir sus requisitos: la ley número 741 y la 1.757, respectivamente. No obstante, habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes en sus más de 20 años de vigencia, ningún gobernante fue revocado hasta ahora. Este artículo se aboca por tanto a analizar, en primer lugar, el diseño institucional de la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia, para determinar si el mismo ha tendido a facilitar o a dificultar su uso por parte de la población. En igual sentido, se abordaron las sucesivas modificaciones realizadas a través de las mencionadas leyes, las que se orientaron a reducir requisitos claves como: la cantidad de firmas necesarias para acompañar la solicitud, la participación mínima exigida en el referéndum para validar la votación, el número de votos necesarios para destituir al mandatario, entre otros. Asimismo, se estudia el desempeño empírico de esta herramienta durante el período 1997-2015. Los resultados obtenidos indican que, a pesar de las reformas reglamentarias que redujeron en forma progresiva sus requisitos de implementación, y habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes, ningún mandatario fue revocado. Entre sus causas se identifica el incentivo político que el reemplazo del revocado vía elecciones implica para sus opositores interesados en arribar anticipadamente al poder. Sin embargo, el uso político electoral de este mecanismo, a manos de ex y futuros candidatos al cargo, no ha sido acompañado en las urnas de un apoyo popular suficiente para alcanzar las adhesiones mínimas requeridas para la revocación. De este modo, la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia funcionaría menos como un mecanismo de control ciudadano que como un instrumento de disputa política intra-élite. Summary:I. Introduction. II. Brief Definition of the Recall. III. The Recall In Colombia: Institutional Analysis 1. Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991. 2. Law No. 131 «By which the programmatic vote is regulated and other provisions are enacted», 1994. 3. Law No. 134 «By which are dictated norms on citizen participation mechanisms», 1994. 4. Law No. 741 Reforming Laws 131 and 134, 2002 5. Statutory Law No. 1,757, 2015. IV. Performance of the Recall in Colombia: its Application Between 1997 and 201. V. Conclusions Abstract:Since the 90s, after the crisis of the mass representation model characteristic of the Welfare States, and the arrival of the so-called audience democracy, typical of the States of the Global Era, several Latin American countries undertook constitutional reforms in which, among other changes, incorporated citizen participation and control mechanisms associated with participatory and direct conceptions of democracy, such as: the popular initiative, the popular consultation, the participatory budget and the recall, among others. This last tool of vertical societal accountability allows the citizens to dismiss the representatives elected by them through the vote in a referendum, which is called after their promoters have managed to gather the minimum number of signatures required to carry out the initiative. Colombia incorporated it in its 1991 Constitution, but only to dismiss governors and mayors. That is, executive authorities at the subnational level, thus excluding the president and legislators at all levels. In 1994 two laws regulated its exercise: law number 131 and 134. In the years 2002 and 2015, modifications were approved tending to diminish its requirements: law number 741 and 1.757, respectively. However, having submitted numerous applications in its more than 20 years of validity, no ruler was revoked until now. This article focuses on analyzing, first, the institutional design of the recall in Colombia, to determine if it has tended to facilitate or hinder its use by the population. In the same sense, the successive modifications carried out through the aforementioned laws were studied, which were aimed at reducing key requirements such as: the number of signatures needed to accompany the request, the minimum participation required in the referendum to validate the vote, the number of votes needed to dismiss the president, among others. Likewise, the empirical performance of this tool is studied during the period 1997-2015. The results obtained indicate that, despite the regulatory reforms that progressively reduced their implementation requirements, and having submitted numerous requests, no agent was revoked. Among its causes is identified the political incentive that the replacement of the revoked rulers via elections implies for its opponents interested in arriving in advance to power. However, the electoral political use of this mechanism, at the hands of former and future candidates for office, has not been accompanied at the polls with sufficient popular support to reach the minimum adhesions required for the revocation. In this way, the recall in Colombia would work less as a mechanism of citizen control than as an instrument of intra-elite political dispute