La ruptura de la constitución material del Estado social: la constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria como paradigma

Abstract:In August 2011, the government and the main opposition party agreed the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, arguing the need for a constitutional corset to the public deficit in order to face the challenges of the first systemic crisis of the globalization, which in turn juridification of an austerity principle of social State. In this sense, the constitutionalization of the principle of budgetary stability becomes a prerequisite for the recovery of market confidence in a context of global crisis that makes necessary to redefine the deficit policy in order to suit the requirements demanded by new processes in course. However, the constitutionalization of a limit to public debt and government spending, far from representing a minor reform that does not affect the substantive aspects of the Constitution, means a substantial alteration of our form of social State positivized by Article 1.1 of the Constitution. Basically, from the point of view of the economic constitution of social constitutionalism, true scope of realization of the transformations performed by this form of state. In fact, with the reform a new relationship between politics and economy is established. A relationship characterised by the centrality of the accumulation strategy and the subordination of the social spending. This centrality of the market stands the market at the centre of the form of State and materializes the material constitution of European market constitutionalism, already infiltrated into legislative sphere, in the formal constitutional space. For these reasons, we consider as inappropriate those proposals according to which the constitutionalization of budgetary stability is in line with the basic values adopted by our Constitution in 1978. Particularly, because the reform breaks with the dialectic logic superimposing an element, budgetary stability, that is not capable of being integrated into the constitutional dialectic.Resumen:En agosto de 2011, el gobierno y el principal partido de la oposición acordaban la reforma del artículo 135 de la Constitución española, argumentando la necesidad de establecer un corsé constitucional al déficit público ante los desafíos de la primera crisis sistémica de la globalización, con la consiguiente juridificación de un principio de austeridad del Estado social. En este sentido, la constitucionalización del principio de estabilidad presupuestaria deviene condición sine qua non para la recuperación de la confianza de los mercados en un contexto de crisis global, que hace necesario redefinir la política de déficit para adaptarla a las exigencias demandadas por los nuevos procesos en curso. Sin embargo, la constitucionalización de un límite a la deuda y gasto público lejos de representar una reforma menor que no afecta a aspectos sustantivos de la Carta Magna, implica una alteración sustancial y sin precedentes de nuestra forma de Estado social positivizada por el artículo 1.1 de la Constitución. Fundamentalmente, desde el punto de vista de la constitución económica del constitucionalismo social, verdadero ámbito de materialización de las trasformaciones actuadas por esta forma de Estado. De hecho, con la reforma se establece una nueva relación entre política y economía caracterizada por la centralidad de la estrategia de acumulación y la subordinación del vínculo social. La centralidad del mercado sitúa en el centro de la forma de Estado al mercado, y materializa en el ámbito formal constitucional, la constitución material del constitucionalismo de mercado europeo que ya se había infiltrado en el ámbito infraconstitucional. Por eso, consideramos erróneas aquellas reflexiones que definen la constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria como un ejercicio reformador coherente con el cuerpo básico de valores consensuado en 1978. En particular, porque la reforma rompe con la lógica dialéctica al superponer un elemento, la estabilidad presupuestaria, que no es susceptible de ser integrado en la dialéctica constitucional.Abstract:In August 2011, the government and the main opposition party agreed the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, arguing the need for a constitutional corset to the public deficit in order to face the challenges of the first systemic crisis of the globalization, which in turn juridification of an austerity principle of social State. In this sense, the constitutionalization of the principle of budgetary stability becomes a prerequisite for the recovery of market confidence in a context of global crisis that makes necessary to redefine the deficit policy in order to suit the requirements demanded by new processes in course. However, the constitutionalization of a limit to public debt and government spending, far from representing a minor reform that does not affect the substantive aspects of the Constitution, means a substantial alteration of our form of social State positivized by Article 1.1 of the Constitution. Basically, from the point of view of the economic constitution of social constitutionalism, true scope of realization of the transformations performed by this form of state. In fact, with the reform a new relationship between politics and economy is established. A relationship characterised by the centrality of the accumulation strategy and the subordination of the social spending. This centrality of the market stands the market at the centre of the form of State and materializes the material constitution of European market constitutionalism, already infiltrated into legislative sphere, in the formal constitutional space. For these reasons, we consider as inappropriate those proposals according to which the constitutionalization of budgetary stability is in line with the basic values adopted by our Constitution in 1978. Particularly, because the reform breaks with the dialectic logic superimposing an element, budgetary stability, that is not capable of being integrated into the constitutional dialectic