Judicial Reasoning and Social Change

Some people are beginning to doubt that courts are doing well in responding to recent social problems. I doubt it myself. Part of the problem may lie in the way the courts-and through the courts, lawyers generally-have conceived of the proper nature of judicial reasoning. There is a great deal about our court system, including its habitual process of reasoning and argumentation, that is worth preserving; but change may be in order. The objective of this article is to investigate ways in which such change may be realized. The method of approach to the subject matter is somewhat unorthodox in appearance but can be seen as similar to any search for what Professor Wechsler has termed "neutral principles." The particular unorthodoxy of this article lies in the attempt to examine what are now problems in the courts without the habitual use of the relevant legal terminology. The reader is therefore requested to temporarily refrain from interjecting what may seem to be relevant legal concepts and doctrine so that any initial dissonance which may be felt does not cause rejection of the discussion solely because of the approach