Add to ORKGWe provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed in groups, with preferences satisfying the single-crossing property separately inside each group. We also show that the majority voting social preference is acycli
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a function of individual ...
We provide intuitive, formal, and computational evidence that in a large society Condorcet's paradox...
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed ...
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single--peaked preferences on median spaces. This...
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is\ud either ...
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferenc...
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alter...
Among all existing paradoxes of voting, the one pointed out by Condorcet has managed to become known...
We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class o...
This paper studies the strategic foundation of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein in: Pub C...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other altern...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a function of individual ...
We provide intuitive, formal, and computational evidence that in a large society Condorcet's paradox...
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed ...
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single--peaked preferences on median spaces. This...
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is\ud either ...
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferenc...
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alter...
Among all existing paradoxes of voting, the one pointed out by Condorcet has managed to become known...
We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class o...
This paper studies the strategic foundation of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein in: Pub C...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other altern...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a function of individual ...
We provide intuitive, formal, and computational evidence that in a large society Condorcet's paradox...