Add to ORKGWe report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections)
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...