We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
AbstractWe study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we ...
In this paper, we study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are reve...
We study selfish routing in ring networks with respect to minimizing the maximum latency. Our main r...
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum l...
We consider a priority-based selfish routing model, where agents may have different priorities on a ...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibr...
We study the problem of selfishly routing splittable traffic with respect to maximum congestion th...
We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case o...
AbstractIn this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Resea...
We study the problem of selfish routing in the pres-ence of incomplete network information. Our mode...
We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a...
This thesis presents an investigation into selfish routing games from three main perspectives. These...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
AbstractWe study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we ...
In this paper, we study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are reve...
We study selfish routing in ring networks with respect to minimizing the maximum latency. Our main r...
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum l...
We consider a priority-based selfish routing model, where agents may have different priorities on a ...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibr...
We study the problem of selfishly routing splittable traffic with respect to maximum congestion th...
We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case o...
AbstractIn this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Resea...
We study the problem of selfish routing in the pres-ence of incomplete network information. Our mode...
We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a...
This thesis presents an investigation into selfish routing games from three main perspectives. These...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
AbstractWe study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we ...
In this paper, we study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are reve...