We identify two possible equilibrium configurations for a non-renewable resource duopoly in a discrete-time framework. For the purpose of illustration, we suppose initial endowments of firms that allow for a maximum of two extraction periods. In the first possible equilibrium, the duopoly exists for two periods, while in the second possible equilibrium, the duopoly lasts only for one period and the firm with the higher initial endowment becomes a monopolist in the second and last period. As neither equilibrium configuration dominates the other for both firms at the same time, it is unclear whether firms acting simultaneously can coordinate on one particular configuration
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game be...
AbstractThis paper deals with the problem of how to supply an exhaustible resource which is availabl...
Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the op...
We identify two possible equilibrium configurations for a non-renewable resource duopoly in a discre...
Ce mémoire s'intéresse au comportement des firmes faisant l'extraction d'une ressource naturelle non...
This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harv...
Exploitation of non–renewable resources is an intensively studied field of environmental economics i...
Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production fun...
We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fri...
I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource explo...
This thesis is concerned with game-theoretic models of oligopoly resource markets. They revolve aro...
In this paper a dierential game model of renewable resource ex- ploitation is considered in which rm...
This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures in markets for nonrenewable natur...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game be...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-renewable resource game. ...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game be...
AbstractThis paper deals with the problem of how to supply an exhaustible resource which is availabl...
Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the op...
We identify two possible equilibrium configurations for a non-renewable resource duopoly in a discre...
Ce mémoire s'intéresse au comportement des firmes faisant l'extraction d'une ressource naturelle non...
This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harv...
Exploitation of non–renewable resources is an intensively studied field of environmental economics i...
Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production fun...
We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fri...
I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource explo...
This thesis is concerned with game-theoretic models of oligopoly resource markets. They revolve aro...
In this paper a dierential game model of renewable resource ex- ploitation is considered in which rm...
This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures in markets for nonrenewable natur...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game be...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-renewable resource game. ...
We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game be...
AbstractThis paper deals with the problem of how to supply an exhaustible resource which is availabl...
Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the op...