Add to ORKGIf individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the social choice problem, that is, the problem of aggregating their observations, is one of statistical inference. This study develops a statistical methodology that can be used to evaluate the properties of a given voting or aggregation rule. These techniques are then applied to some well-known rules
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules....
A statistical criterion for evaluating the appropriateness of preference aggregation functions for a...
Many decision problems cannot be solved exactly and use several estimation algorithms that assign sc...
We approach the social choice problem as one of optimal statistical inference. If individual voters ...
We adopt an `epistemic' interpretation of social decisions: there is an objectively correct choice, ...
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, an...
Some researchers have addressed the problem of aggregating individual preferences or rankings by see...
Abstract. Nurmi (1987) investigated the relationship between voting rules by deter-mining the freque...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when pre...
Drissi-Bakhkhat and Truchon [“Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabil...
Abstract. The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical do-main due to a lack of ...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
For centuries, the mathematical aggregation of preferences by groups, organizations or society has r...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules....
A statistical criterion for evaluating the appropriateness of preference aggregation functions for a...
Many decision problems cannot be solved exactly and use several estimation algorithms that assign sc...
We approach the social choice problem as one of optimal statistical inference. If individual voters ...
We adopt an `epistemic' interpretation of social decisions: there is an objectively correct choice, ...
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, an...
Some researchers have addressed the problem of aggregating individual preferences or rankings by see...
Abstract. Nurmi (1987) investigated the relationship between voting rules by deter-mining the freque...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when pre...
Drissi-Bakhkhat and Truchon [“Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabil...
Abstract. The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical do-main due to a lack of ...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
For centuries, the mathematical aggregation of preferences by groups, organizations or society has r...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules....
A statistical criterion for evaluating the appropriateness of preference aggregation functions for a...
Many decision problems cannot be solved exactly and use several estimation algorithms that assign sc...