The Question of the (Im)Possibility of Metaphysical Freedom and Moral Responsibility – with Special Regard to Galen Strawson\u27s Basic Argument

V magistrskem delu obravnavam vprašanje (ne)možnosti metafizične svobode in moralne odgovornosti, in sicer s posebnim ozirom na zloglasni argument filozofa Galena Strawsona. Analizo pričnem z orisom povezave med svobodo, moralno odgovornostjo in dejavnikovo zmožnostjo, da nad samim seboj in svojim delovanjem izkazuje relevantno vrsto nadzora. Razmejim med tremi pomembnimi vprašanji, ki obkrožajo filozofsko razpravo o svobodi: »Vprašanjem možnosti«, »Vprašanjem obstoja« in »Vprašanjem združljivosti«. Sledi kratek očrt (sodobne) razprave, zlasti z vidika teh vprašanj. Nato ponudim nekaj dodatnih terminoloških pojasnil in natančneje opredelim nekatere osrednje pojme dela, kot so »kompatibilizem«, »inkompatibilizem«, »libertarizem«, »imposibilizem«, »determinizem« in »moralna odgovornost«. V središče razpravljanja postavim svobodo, ki je potrebna za moralno odgovornost v smislu »osnovne«, nepragmatično pojmovane zaslužnosti. Sledi predstavitev Strawsonovega »osnovnega argumenta« (OA), ki si prizadeva dokazati nemožnost tovrstne svobode. Razlikujem med štirimi osnovnimi različicami argumenta in jih eno za drugo podrobneje predočim. Nato začrtam nekaj temeljnih filozofskih presojanj OA. Začnem s kompatibilističnimi ugovori, kjer se osredotočim na ugovor Justina D. Coatesa, nadaljujem z inkompatibilističnimi oz. libertarističnimi ugovori, kjer se osredinim na ugovor Richarda Swinburna, in zaključim z imposibilističnimi zagovori, kjer osvetlim zagovora Neila Levyja in Michaela Anthonyja Istvana, jr. Delo sklenem na strani »posibilistov«. Pokazati skušam, da imposibilistični argumenti, kakršen je Strawsonov OA, niso prepričljivi in da svoboda, ki je potrebna za relevantno vrsto moralne odgovornosti, lahko obstaja (tj. je metafizično in logično možna). Nazadnje zavrnem »monistično« stališče, po katerem je resničen bodisi kompatibilizem bodisi inkompatibilizem, in ponudim zagovor »temeljnega dualizma«, ki zatrjuje tako delno resničnost kompatibilizma kot delno resničnost inkompatibilizma. Sledi kratek prikaz »pesimističnega« dualizma Saula Smilanskega, ki vztraja pri nemožnosti globlje, z resničnostjo determinizma nezdružljive vrste svobode. Sam v nasprotju s takšnim stališčem dopuščam možnost delne resničnosti libertarizma, posledično pa tudi možni obstoj svobode, ki lahko po eni strani bistveno nadgradi plitkejše, z resničnostjo determinizma združljive vrste svobode, po drugi strani pa služi kot globlja možna utemeljitev prenekaterih naših vsakodnevnih (samo)pripisov svobode in moralne odgovornosti.In my master\u27s thesis, I address the issue of the (im)possibility of metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility, with special regard to the infamous argument by the philosopher Galen Strawson. I begin the analysis by outlining the connection between freedom, moral responsibility and the agent\u27s ability to exercise a relevant type of control over themselves and their actions. I distinguish between three essential questions that surround the philosophical debate on freedom: "The question of possibility", "The question of existence" and "The question of compatibility". This is followed by a brief outline of the (contemporary) debate, especially in terms of the mentioned questions. I then offer some additional terminological explanations and define more thoroughly some central concepts of the thesis, such as "compatibilism", "incompatibilism", "libertarianism", "impossibilism", "determinism" and "moral responsibility". At the centre of the debate is the freedom that is necessary for moral responsibility in the sense of "basic", non-pragmatically understood desert. What follows is a presentation of Strawson\u27s "basic argument" (BA), which seeks to prove the impossibility of such freedom. I distinguish between four basic versions of the argument and present them in more detail one by one. I then outline some fundamental philosophical judgments on the BA. I start with compatibilist objections, where I focus on the objection by Justin D. Coates, continue with incompatibilist or libertarian objections, where I concentrate on the objection by Richard Swinburne, and conclude with impossibilist defences, where I highlight the defences by Neil Levy and Michael Anthony Istvan Jr. I conclude my work on the side of the "possibilists". I aim to show that impossibilist arguments such as Strawson\u27s BA are not convincing and that the freedom required for the relevant type of moral responsibility can exist (i.e., it is metaphysically and logically possible). Finally, I reject the "monist" view that either compatibilism or incompatibilism is true and offer a defence of "fundamental dualism", which asserts both the partial truth of compatibilism and the partial truth of incompatibilism. What follows is a brief account of Saul Smilansky\u27s "pessimistic" dualism, which insists on the impossibility of a deeper type of freedom incompatible with the reality of determinism. Contrary to this view, I allow the possibility of a partial truth of libertarianism and consequently the possible existence of freedom, which can, on the one hand, significantly upgrade shallower types of freedom compatible with the reality of determinism and, on the other hand, serve as a deeper justification for many of our everyday (self)attributions of freedom and moral responsibility