Nationalism in Chinese foreign policy: The case of China's response to the United States in 1989-2000.

This thesis is concerned with nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Adopting methods of comparative studies and formalised language analysis, through the case study of China's response to US engagement, this thesis explores the nationalist momentum in Chinese foreign policy during 1989-2000 and how the CCP loosely controls Chinese IR scholars' nationalist writings. The thesis argues that China is not a revisionist state despite the rise of the new nationalism. Chinese foreign policy since 1989 is best understood as largely being the product of an effectively yet loosely controlled, plural and reactive nationalism and that the CCP's domestic considerations keep Chinese foreign policy inward-looking. This thesis also argues that Chinese elites regard the US engagement policy as patronising and paternalistic and thus it fails to achieve its core objectives that centre on no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and respect for international rules. It has been found that focal points of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are legitimacy of the CCP's one-party rule, territorial control and modernization and that the new Chinese nationalism is a weak force. It has also been found that the US engagement policy toward China has generated nationalism in China and the CCP's response is mainly defensive arguments rather than hostile acts. I support my argument with a study of the CCP's official terms and Chinese IR scholars' writings. I examine how Chinese IR scholars try to follow the CCP's party line in foreign policy and how various groups of Chinese IR scholars interpret the party line in different ways. Focusing on the case of China's response to US engagement, I analyse Chinese elites' nationalistic views on the US approach to China in respect of security, political, cultural and economic issues. The implication of my research is that the growing concern about China threat has been in regional perceptions of Chinese goals rather than the CCP's diplomacy per se