Politics of German defence policy: Policy leadership, Bundeswehr reform and European defence and security policy.

This thesis is a study of the role of policy leadership in German defence and security policy between 1990 and 2002, with particular reference to reform of the Bundeswehr. It situates this case study in the framework of a set of analytical perspectives about policy change derived from public policy theory, arguing that public policy theory has either underestimated policy leadership or failed to discriminate different leadership roles, styles and strategies. The author rejects the dominant contextualist and culturalist approach to leadership in studies of German defence and security policy in favour of an interactionist approach that stresses the dialectical interaction between policy skills and strategic context. The case study also shifts the focus in studies of policy leadership in Germany away from a preoccupation with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive. The thesis illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from Europeanisation and 'NATO-isation', and the domestic politics of base closures. It also shows how domestic macro-political arrangements predispose leadership roles in German defence and security policy towards brokerage and veto playing rather than towards entrepreneurship