Should deliberations seek for consensus or clarify conflict? Addressing a Blind Spot in Theories of Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy has been a central strand of political theory for more than four decades now. Thanks to multiple critics, it has evolved following some broad patterns of inquiries. To better understand those trends, I will begin by identifying four main critics, coming both from outside and within the field of deliberative democracy. This will allow me to highlight a salient tension that the normative branch of the field is currently facing : the acceptation that a desirable outcome of a deliberative process could not only be consensus, but also conflicts clarification. This raise several problems when one is to evaluate a deliberative process. But it is also a conundrum for designers of deliberative instances, given that both purposes call for very different procedures to achieve them. Facing such a tension, scholars widely argue that this matter should be handled contextually. One will strive for consensus or settle for conflicts clarification depending on the contextual constraints as well as on the unfolding of the deliberative process. I argue that this current solution is problematic. First, because it does not take into account that a minimal form of conflicts clarification is a necessary condition for deliberation to occur. Secondly (and intimately linked with the previous point), because this solution rests on a confusion regarding the nature of this crucial operation of conflicts clarification. By not specifying the nature of this operation, theories of deliberative democracy are evolving around a blind spot hindering their potentials. Notably, this leads them to put forth insufficient solutions to the four critiques previously mentioned. Therefore, I will argue for the urgent need to elucidate the operation of conflicts clarification and adumbrate a first step towards that aim as a conclusio