A Theory of Potential Interest Groups' Government Regulation:Evolution and Reconstruction

通过梳理传统利益集团规制理论的演进脉络,指出迄今为止的利益集团理论仍然存在几个不足,尤其缺乏对潜在利益集团的研究,规制经济学家也认为潜在利益集团没有政治影响力而将其排除于规制模型分析之外。文章试图阐明一种潜在利益集团视角下的政府规制模型,从理论上论证潜在的个体消费者如何解决集体行动困境问题,即如何完成个体利益的组织、表达和反馈等政治行动,这些问题的回答使利益集团理论从经济学回到政治学。最后提出潜在利益集团视角下政府规制的政策含义及其重点研究的四大主题。There are still several shortcomings of traditional interest group regulation theory,especially lack research of potential interest groups.Regulatory economists do not believe political influence of potential interest groups,even excluded them from the regulatory model.This article attempts to clarify a potential interest group model of government regulation,finishing theoretical argument of individual consumers how to solve the dilemma of collective action,how to complete political action such as organization,expression and feedback of individual interests.It means a return of interest group theory from economics to politics by answering to these questions.Article concludes policy implications and four themes of government regulation with a potential interest group perspective finally.国家社会科学基金重点项目“十二五时期公共服务标准化创新机制研究”(10AZD005);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2010221016)的阶段性成