Arguably, if a court holds a defendant liable for negligently inflicting harm on the plaintiff, this intervention combines three effects: (1) the court specifies the normative expectation, (2) the court expresses dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's behavior, for example, her level of activity, and (3) the court obliges the defendant to compensate the plaintiff. In the field, it would be close to impossible to disentangle the three effects, or to investigate how they interact with intrinsic reticence to inflict harm on a passive outsider. We therefore go to the lab. We do not find an effect of intrinsic morality. However, the intervention has a separate significant effect on each of the three channels
Traditional learning maintains that liability for negligence is ultimately premised on notions of mo...
Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her con...
We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort rules. The social...
Arguably, if a court holds a defendant liable for negligently inflicting harm on the plaintiff, this...
International audienceWe conduct an experiment where participants choose between actions that provid...
We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test,...
This article is an introduction to and commentary on the contributions to a Symposium on Negligence...
The negligence-versus–strict liability debate is over in tort law, and negligence has clearly won. Y...
Two studies were performed to ascertain the effect of injury severity on par-ticipants ’ judgments i...
In the experimental game designed by GÜTH et al. [2007], player 1 has promised to render a service t...
To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punis...
Social life is inherently risky. Who should bear the costs of accidental harm? That issue has been t...
Within the framework of the Story Model of juror decision making, using an actual personal injury au...
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their li...
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third partie...
Traditional learning maintains that liability for negligence is ultimately premised on notions of mo...
Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her con...
We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort rules. The social...
Arguably, if a court holds a defendant liable for negligently inflicting harm on the plaintiff, this...
International audienceWe conduct an experiment where participants choose between actions that provid...
We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test,...
This article is an introduction to and commentary on the contributions to a Symposium on Negligence...
The negligence-versus–strict liability debate is over in tort law, and negligence has clearly won. Y...
Two studies were performed to ascertain the effect of injury severity on par-ticipants ’ judgments i...
In the experimental game designed by GÜTH et al. [2007], player 1 has promised to render a service t...
To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punis...
Social life is inherently risky. Who should bear the costs of accidental harm? That issue has been t...
Within the framework of the Story Model of juror decision making, using an actual personal injury au...
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their li...
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third partie...
Traditional learning maintains that liability for negligence is ultimately premised on notions of mo...
Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her con...
We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort rules. The social...