In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the choice of bank and firm capital structure and the cost of equity and deposit finance. Despite risk neutrality, equity capital is more costly than deposits. When banks directly finance risky investments, they hold positive capital and diversify. When they make risky loans to firms, banks trade off the high cost of equity with the diversification benefits from a lower bankruptcy probability. When bankruptcy costs are high, banks use no capital and only lend to one sector. When these are low, banks hold capital and diversify
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the choice ...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of...
Published online: 20 November 2014In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity ...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of...
We describe a model in which bank deposits yield liquidity services and therefore earn a lower rate ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
This paper constructs a theoretical model that integrates the two objectives of capital adequacy req...
We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirem...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
We study bank regulation under optimal contracting, absent exogenous distortions. In equilibrium, ba...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the choice ...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of...
Published online: 20 November 2014In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity ...
In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of...
We describe a model in which bank deposits yield liquidity services and therefore earn a lower rate ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
This paper constructs a theoretical model that integrates the two objectives of capital adequacy req...
We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirem...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
We study bank regulation under optimal contracting, absent exogenous distortions. In equilibrium, ba...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...
In the recent financial crisis, reorganizations of distressed financial institutions following the g...