The Possibility of Interactive Dualism in a Causally Closed World

The causal closure principle (CCP) and the arguments that stem from its numerous variations pose a significant threat to the possibility of mental causation. There are however dualistic theories that can answer this threat. Lowe’s non-Cartesian substance dualism is one of them. In this thesis, I will follow his treatment of the CCP in order to reconstruct a working definition of mental causation. This definition is still susceptible to some physicalist arguments that show the incompatibility of mental causation and physicalism on a more general level. By treating these arguments, the main conviction on which the physicalist relies will be laid bare, namely the reliance on the fact that empirical research and data will be sufficient to paint a complete picture of the world. By taking a stand against this belief, I will ultimately argue that mere existence of mental phenomena implies mental causation, and that the empirical standard purported by the physicalists is ill suited for the research on mental activity