Free, resentment, and social criticism : a critical reflection on Daoism

This dissertation aims to address the dialectical relation between Daoist existential freedom and social criticism. It introduces, first, the Daoist understanding of freedom by providing a critical examination of Legalism. It shows that the Daoist understanding of freedom has to do with a moral psychology concerning the nature of power and its relation to the mechanisms of internalization and socialization. Then, it goes on to argue that although Daoist freedom is concerned with power, it is not politically oriented but is rather concerned chiefly with existential suffering. Being free in this sense, according to this line of argument, is to be able to rid oneself of the additional, “intensional” suffering. In making sense of this existential freedom, the structural features of Daoism—the compartmentalization of two realms and a shift of focus in the exercise of agency—are laid bare. The dissertation then explains why Daoist existential freedom should be understood as freedom from resentment, by providing a qualitative analysis of Daoist freedom and the suffering it aims to do away with. It argues, further, that the two realms of Daoism are governed by two different notions, both of which are conducive to freedom from resentment. Finally, the dissertation examines the central ideas that surround Daoist freedom from resentment, including spontaneity, the metaphysical Dao, and naturalness. By making a distinction between the origin of this freedom and its (possible) subsequent function, the dissertation holds that a balance needs to be struck between Daoist existential freedom and social criticism.published_or_final_versionPhilosophyDoctoralDoctor of Philosoph