An??lise descritiva entre os modelos institucionais de regula????o econ??mica da explora????o do petr??leo nos Estados Unidos, Brasil, Argentina, Venezuela e Ar??bia Saudita

O objetivo do presente estudo ?? analisar as formas institucionais de regula????o da produ????o de petr??leo dos Estados Unidos, Brasil, Argentina, Venezuela e Ar??bia Saudita, especialmente do ponto de vista da forma contratual com que esses pa??ses concedem a explora????o em seus territ??rios e do n??vel de interven????o direta do Estado nessa explora????o. Nesse sentido, a regulamenta????o dos setores de servi??os de utilidade p??blica tende a acomodar os interesses de grupos de press??o, especialmente as ind??strias reguladas e os consumidores, como forma de apoio pol??tico ao governo. Portanto, ?? imperioso que se adicione ?? teoria econ??mica da regula????o o aspecto institucional dos pa??ses como elemento-chave na valoriza????o de um ou outro grupo de interesse atrav??s da interven????o na economia. O petr??leo ?? um produto estrat??gico no cen??rio da economia internacional, e por isso os Estados tendem a apoiar ou criar empresas para a produ????o de petr??leo, procurando participar dos ganhos pela sua extra????o. Assim, buscou-se investigar quatro realidades distintas quanto ?? produ????o, consumo, capacidade de refino e com??rcio do petr??leo nos pa??ses estudados. Al??m disso, foram analisadas as formas de arranjos institucionais distintos pelos quais esses pa??ses regulam a explora????o do petr??leo em seus territ??rios, seja atrav??s de contratos de concess??o e institucionaliza????o de ag??ncias reguladoras do setor, como os Estados Unidos, ou apenas com contratos de concess??o sem ag??ncias reguladoras, como no caso argentino. No caso venezuelano, existe apenas contrato de joint-venture entre a iniciativa privada e a empresa estatal de explora????o, sem ag??ncia reguladora. A Ar??bia Saudita n??o possui ag??ncia reguladora e explora a extra????o de petr??leo diretamente pela empresa do s??dito, da qual det??m 100% de participa????o, e assim contrata apenas servi??os espec??ficos, sem concess??o. Finalmente o caso brasileiro, onde se verifica a exist??ncia de contratos de concess??o, bem como ag??ncia reguladora do setor e uma empresa de capital estatal atuando no mercado.The objective of the present study is to analyze the institutional forms of oil production regulation in United States, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, especially the contractual point of view these countries grant the exploration in its territories and about the level of direct intervention of the State in this exploration. Regulation about public utility services tends to especially accommodate the interests of lobbies, the regulated industries and the consumers, as form to support government politician. Therefore, is necessary adds in the economic regulation theory the institutional aspect about the countries like element-key in the valuation if one or another interest group through the intervention in the economy for regulation. Oil is a strategical product in the scene of the international economy, and therefore the States tend to support or to create companies for oil production, being looked for to participate in profits for its extraction. Four different realities how much production, consumption, capacity of refining and commerce of the oil was studied. Moreover, the forms of distinct institutional arrangements had been analyzed for which these countries regulate the exploration of the oil in its territories, either through contracts of concession and institutionalization sector regulating agencies, as the United States, or only with concession contracts without regulating agencies, as in the Argentine case. In the Venezuelan case, only contract of joint-venture between the private initiative and the state-owned company of exploration exists, without regulating agency. Saudi Arabia does not possess regulating agency and explores the extration of oil directly for the company of the subject, of which it withholds 100% of participation, and thus contracts only specific services, without concession. Finally the Brazilian case, where there is concession contract, as well as regulating agency of the sector and a company of state capital acting in the market