The United States and the Indian Ocean region: a case of growing interests

The littoral of the Indian Ocean, the world’s third-largest, consists of forty-seven countries. The ocean, which covers around twenty per cent of the globe’s surface, also contains several geo-strategically important island groups. It is accessed by nine routes (passages), including five key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that are used mainly to transport energy from the Middle East. The economies of Europe, the power-houses of East Asia and the US also depend upon the Indian Ocean SLOCs for the transportation of raw materials, manufactured goods and raw materials. The United States has been the de facto security provider for these SLOCs since the 1960s. This situation was an extension of its (also de facto) role as the predominant power in the Middle East, upon which it depended for its energy security. Its vision was limited in the main, however, to the Middle East, no matter that it established at least one base within the Indian Ocean outside of that region. Until 1976, the US Department of Defense divided its responsibility for oversight of the Indian Ocean Region between its Atlantic and Pacific Commands. This construct has been changed to granting oversight of the region to Pacific Command, Central Command and Africa Command, each maintaining responsibility for approximately one-third of the region. (A fourth body, European Command, is responsible for the oversight of the Gulf of Aqaba, among other geographical areas, which provides access to the western reaches of the Indian Ocean. This command will be ignored for reasons of convenience in this paper.) These demarcations do not coincide with those of the Department of State, either, but this, too, will be left unaddressed since it has no real bearing upon this paper