This paper studies the impact of European bank mergers on changes in key safety and soundness measures of both acquirers and targets. We find that acquirers in cross‐border deals tend to perform better when their home country prudential supervisors and deposit insurance funding systems are stricter than that of the target. For target banks, we find that stronger supervision and tougher deposit insurance funding regimes result in positive post merger changes in liquidity and performance. Overall, while bank mergers have undermined bank safety and soundness in some cases, our evidence indicates that strong regulation and supervision can partly ameliorate this
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. F...
Although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control may constitute a barrier to the integration...
We study the stock market valuation of mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry. Ba...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. W...
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This...
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. W...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of domestic and cross-border bank takeovers in th...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We ...
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. F...
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. F...
Although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control may constitute a barrier to the integration...
We study the stock market valuation of mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry. Ba...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. W...
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This...
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. W...
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of domestic and cross-border bank takeovers in th...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
We study the impact on bank merger activity of the strengthening in merger control legislation intro...
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We ...
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. F...
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. F...
Although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control may constitute a barrier to the integration...
We study the stock market valuation of mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry. Ba...