Determinants of executive directors’ remuneration among Malaysian public listed companies

Directors’ remuneration has been subjected to continuous study by researchers in different fields such as accounting, management, human resource and psychology. Accounting scholars primarily based their research on agency theory. Recent papers focused on the affect of corporate governance on the determination of directors’ remuneration. This study aims to investigate the effect of three main variables on directors’ remuneration – corporate governance variables, human capital attributes and firm performance. The study controls the effect of firm size, type of industry, leverage, diversification and location. 417 (50%) Malaysian public listed companies were selected using stratified random sampling for three years period from 2004 to 2006. Only non-financial companies are included in the sample because financial companies are subjected to different set of regulations in Malaysia. Using multiple regression method, it is found that seven corporate governance variables are significantly related to directors’ remuneration. The study shows that board size, CEO-chairman duality role, proportion of independent directors and proportion of interlocking directors in the board are significantly related to directors’ remuneration. Proportion of non-executive directors in the board, percentage of indirect directors’ shareholding and percentage of block holders’ shareholdings are found to be negatively related to directors’ remuneration. Of the three human capital attributes studied, only executive directors’ average age and tenure are found to be significantly related to the level of directors’ remuneration. No evidence was found to conclude the role of qualification towards level of directors’ remuneration. The model used was tested for its robustness using different set of alternative measures for some of its key variables. Corrections were also made to address other common problems associated with multiple regression such as outliers, non-normality of residuals, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. Finally, the study extends the analysis by running fixed effect model in order to control for firm specific effects. There are few discrepancies between the pooled regression model and fixed effect model result but this may be caused by little variation over time among governance variables. Finally, the findings further supports the agency theory by showing that, among Malaysian companies, performance still plays significant role in determining rewards for its director