Add to ORKGSoames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this
Th e notion of proposition is pivotal in many areas of philosophy and, in particular, in philosophy ...
This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tens...
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues ...
Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by r...
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discr...
Propositions are traditionally taken to be entities that satisfy A1 – A3. A1. Some things are assert...
Propositions, in addition to being the things that sentences express relative to contexts of utteran...
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discr...
An account of the distinction between singular and general propositions should reflect the core idea...
In this paper I argue that propositionalism (the doctrine that the contents of thoughts and utteranc...
This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses...
I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (...
Soames's cognitive propositions are strings of acts to be performed by an agent, such as predicating...
Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they ha...
Writers in the propositions literature consider the Benacerraf objection serious, often decisive. Th...
Th e notion of proposition is pivotal in many areas of philosophy and, in particular, in philosophy ...
This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tens...
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues ...
Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by r...
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discr...
Propositions are traditionally taken to be entities that satisfy A1 – A3. A1. Some things are assert...
Propositions, in addition to being the things that sentences express relative to contexts of utteran...
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discr...
An account of the distinction between singular and general propositions should reflect the core idea...
In this paper I argue that propositionalism (the doctrine that the contents of thoughts and utteranc...
This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses...
I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (...
Soames's cognitive propositions are strings of acts to be performed by an agent, such as predicating...
Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they ha...
Writers in the propositions literature consider the Benacerraf objection serious, often decisive. Th...
Th e notion of proposition is pivotal in many areas of philosophy and, in particular, in philosophy ...
This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tens...
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues ...