THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW REGULATORY AGENCIES: INDEPENDENT COMMISSION VERSUS EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AGENCIES

The central research question addressed in this study is: why does Congress select an independent commission to administer some regulatory programs while for others it chooses a departmental agency? Systematic research on this question is notably absent despite the emphasis given organizational arrangements by executive branch reform efforts, specifically those proposed by the Brownlow Committee in 1937 and the Ash Council in 1971. The regulatory literature simply suggests that the commission form of organization is superior to alternative arrangements because it provides a greater degree of fairness, impartiality, expertise, and continuity of policy. This study argues that the belief in the superiority of the commission form of organization constitutes essentially a formal rationale for the choice of a commission and that it is instead political forces which lead to not only the creation of new agencies, but to their organizational arrangements as well. Moreover, this study offers three alternative explanations for the choice of an independent regulatory commission: legislative-executive rivalry, the disruption of traditional clientele ties, and partisan differences between the White House and Capitol Hill. Seven cases were selected for examination, four independent commissions: the FERC, the CFTC, the NRC, and the CPSC, and three departmental agencies: the OSHA, the FGIS, and the MSHA. In order to determine the relative strength of the three factors, the arguments of congressmen, administration officials, and interest group spokesmen were examined as they appeared in such sources as the Congressional Record, congressional committee hearings and reports, and various other government documents. For each of the seven agencies, the factors were then categorized as either strong, moderate, or weak. The research demonstrated that the choice of organizational arrangements is a complex decision; no single explanation emerged. Legislative-executive rivalry and the disruption of traditional clientele ties distinguished relatively well between the two types of regulatory agencies and both factors were either strong or moderate for all but one of the four commissions. Partisan differences, however, failed to distinguish between the commissions and agencies. It was moderately significant in six of the seven cases. . . . (Author's abstract exceeds stipulated maximum length. Discontinued here with permission of school.) UM