How different are £0.50 and £1.50, or "a small chance" and "a good chance", or "three months" and "nine months"? Our experiments show that people behave as if these differences alter after incidental everyday experiences. Preference for a £1.50 lottery rather than a £0.50 lottery was stronger after exposure to intermediate supermarket prices. Preference for "a good chance" of winning rather than "a small chance" was stronger after predicting intermediate probabilities of rain. Preference for consumption in "three month" rather than "nine months" was stronger after planning for an intermediate birthday. These fluctuations offer a direct challenge to economic accounts which translate monies, risks, and delays into subjective equivalents by st...
Many factors point to the underlying instability of preferences in choice behavior. In particular, d...
In three experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of decision making and memory can pred...
Human financial decisions are known to deviate from ‘rational’, particularly under uncertainty and i...
How different are £0.50 and £1.50, “a small chance” and “a good chance,” or “three months” and “nine...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice ...
People tend to discount rewards or losses that occur in the future. Such delay discounting has been ...
The Decision by Sampling (DbS) relative rank model predicts that absolute values and their magnitude...
The first chapter studies preferences for mixing between lotteries. Behavioral theories can be disti...
Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. ...
It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attribu...
Many decisions we face are characterized by risk or uncertainty we must make choices prior to knowin...
In one experiment we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision-making and memory ca...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
In cross‐modal decisions, the options differ on many attributes, and in uni‐modal decisions, they di...
Many factors point to the underlying instability of preferences in choice behavior. In particular, d...
In three experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of decision making and memory can pred...
Human financial decisions are known to deviate from ‘rational’, particularly under uncertainty and i...
How different are £0.50 and £1.50, “a small chance” and “a good chance,” or “three months” and “nine...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice ...
People tend to discount rewards or losses that occur in the future. Such delay discounting has been ...
The Decision by Sampling (DbS) relative rank model predicts that absolute values and their magnitude...
The first chapter studies preferences for mixing between lotteries. Behavioral theories can be disti...
Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. ...
It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attribu...
Many decisions we face are characterized by risk or uncertainty we must make choices prior to knowin...
In one experiment we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision-making and memory ca...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
In cross‐modal decisions, the options differ on many attributes, and in uni‐modal decisions, they di...
Many factors point to the underlying instability of preferences in choice behavior. In particular, d...
In three experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of decision making and memory can pred...
Human financial decisions are known to deviate from ‘rational’, particularly under uncertainty and i...