Health insurance is considered to be a special type of nonlife insurance with two important features. First, compared with property insurance, health insurance provides valuable hedge against unpredictable shocks to health status, instead of loss on property. Therefore, a modified utility function that describes the trade-off between health and wealth should be applied in optimal indemnity design. Second, in the case that the insured is severely or critically ill, with necessary medical treatment, the insured may not fully recover from an illness or an injury. The doctor usually communicates with the patient to set up a personalized treatment plan and explains clearly about the expected outcome beforehand. Hence, there is some probability t...
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured...
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of primary prevention and the social optimum. First, we a...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
My goal in this paper is to use neoclassical welfare economics to discuss the optimal form of insura...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
International audienceWe analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz-ard...
In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection ...
Assurance-maladie; Assurance; Polices; ContratsIn this paper, we want to characterize the optimal he...
This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design ...
There is limited treatment of the optimal protection of assets against casualty or liability loss. T...
When the value of a medical treatment differs across individuals, it may be socially beneficial to t...
Abstract. Insurance regulation is often based on keeping probabilities of failure small and not on a...
This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual ...
Policymakers face difficult choices over which health interventions to publicly finance. We develope...
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured...
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of primary prevention and the social optimum. First, we a...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
My goal in this paper is to use neoclassical welfare economics to discuss the optimal form of insura...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
International audienceWe analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz-ard...
In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection ...
Assurance-maladie; Assurance; Polices; ContratsIn this paper, we want to characterize the optimal he...
This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design ...
There is limited treatment of the optimal protection of assets against casualty or liability loss. T...
When the value of a medical treatment differs across individuals, it may be socially beneficial to t...
Abstract. Insurance regulation is often based on keeping probabilities of failure small and not on a...
This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual ...
Policymakers face difficult choices over which health interventions to publicly finance. We develope...
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyhol...
Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured...
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of primary prevention and the social optimum. First, we a...