Add to ORKGIn auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions
AbstractGreen and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose stra...
© 2016 The Authors Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism,...
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In...
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mec...
We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue ...
Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without...
Micali and Valiant proposed a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is dominant-strategy truthfu...
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by ...
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by ...
We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and le...
AbstractIn combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bid...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Green and Laffont [1] have proven that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism guarantees...
AbstractGreen and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose stra...
© 2016 The Authors Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism,...
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In...
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mec...
We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue ...
Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without...
Micali and Valiant proposed a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is dominant-strategy truthfu...
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by ...
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by ...
We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and le...
AbstractIn combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bid...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Green and Laffont [1] have proven that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism guarantees...
AbstractGreen and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose stra...
© 2016 The Authors Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism,...
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In...