The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-57).In this paper, I examine the ex post and ex ante benefits of conservatism to lenders and borrowers in the debt contracting process. First, I argue that conservatism benefits lenders ex post through a timely signal of default risk in the form of accelerated covenant violations by more conservative borrowers. I present evidence that the likelihood of a covenant violation following a negative shock increases in borrower conservatism. Second, I argue that conservatism benefits borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates. I provide both in- sample and out-of-sample evidence that lenders offer lower interest rates to more conservative borrowers. The result is robust to controlling for a series of other earnings attributes.by Jieying Zhang.Ph.D