Corporate Governance and Board Chair Change

[[abstract]]本研究探討台灣首次公開發行公司(IPO)三年內董事長更換的因素。在台灣與其他新興經濟體中，控制股東通常擁有董事長的位置，並且控制公司。因此董事長的更換，可能意味著控制股東失去控制權。由於控制權可以保護財產，並且為控制股東帶來私人利益，基於這些理由控制股東可能採取一些策略，在IPO過程中保護自身擁有的控制權。本研究使用從2000-2005年期間在台灣上市公司IPO的數據，研究發現，IPO折價較多，CEO雙元性，和董事會規模較小的公司，三年內董事長更換的可能性較小，因此這些方法都可能是控制股東為捍衛自己的控制權，在公司IPO過程中的採取一些保護控制權的策略。 過去的研究主要都在討論，股東與高階管理人的代理問題，主要是基於代理理論，認為代理人(經理人)與主理人(股東)的目標不一致，使得經理人會為追求自己的目標以犧牲股東的利益。 但依據本研究，在台灣與其他新興經濟體之間，主要存在的代理問題是控制股東(大股東)和少數股東(小股東)之間的代理問題。由於正式制度的不健全，而導致控制股東和小股東之間產生代理問題，且控制股東從事剝奪小股東的權益的行為。 This study explores some of the factors that affect board chair change within three years after initial public offering (IPO) of a firm. In Taiwan and other emerging economies, controlling shareholders usually occupy board chair positions and control the firms. Thus change in board chairs may mean controlling shareholders losing their control rights. Because control rights protect property rights and bring private benefits for controlling shareholders, controlling shareholders may like to adopt some strategies to defend their control rights in the IPO process. Using data from 525 IPO firms listed in Taiwan during 2000-2005, this study finds that IPO underpricing, CEO duality, and smaller board size all decrease the likelihood of board chair change, suggesting that these are all possible means for controlling shareholders to defend their control rights in the IPO process. The results of this study are consistent with those of prior research that argues that the main agency problem in Taiwan and other emerging economies are not between shareholders and top managers but between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders