Lobbying for Tariff and the Optimal Entry Mode of the Multinational Firm

[[abstract]]在全球化趨勢下，擁有較佳技術的跨國廠商開始以不同方式跨足海外市場，面對國際競爭，本國廠商亦會利用政治獻金干預政府的貿易決策。本文藉由政治獻金遊說模型討論跨國廠商、本國廠商與政府三方的互動關係。本國廠商一方面運用政治獻金遊說政府，政府一方面則在政治獻金與人民福祉的抉擇中做出決策，最後跨國廠商就在給定遊說的關稅水準之下，選擇對其最有利的方式進入國內市場。本文發現除了政府制訂的關稅水準、兩國廠商成本差異外，社會福利權數亦是影響跨國廠商進入模式的重要因素。不同的社會福利權數可以對應出不同的政府政策，而不同的政府政策亦會牽動跨國廠商進入模式的選擇。此時，政府必須要相當重視社會福利權數，則跨國廠商才會選擇與本國政府偏好一致的進入模式。[[abstract]]In the trend of globalization, the multinational firm with superior technologies intend to employ various strategies for entering the foreign markets. Confronting these international competitions, then the host country firm usually utilize the political contribution to sway the policy. In this paper, we examine the relationships among the multinational firm, host country firm, and the domestic government by the political contribution model. Going with the political contribution from the host country firm, the domestic government usually works out the policy by considering the tradeoff between political contribution and social welfare. Eventually, the multinational firm selects an optimal entry mode with a given tariff to enter the markets which determined by lobby. Our result demonstrates that besides the tariff and cost difference, the social welfare is also crucial to the choice of entry mode. Different social welfare weight brings out various policies which will influence the entry mode of multinational firm. Only when the domestic government takes social welfare seriously, the multinational firm will choose the government-preferred entry mode