Information-Signaling and Competitive Effects of the Establishment of the Financial Holding Company in Taiwan .

碩士論文[[abstract]]論文名稱：金融控股公司設立之訊號發射效果及競爭效果對我國金融產業影響之實證研究 頁數：校系所組別：真理大學管理科學 研究所(學系) 組畢業時間及提要別：九十一 學年度 二 學期 碩士 學位論文提要研究生： 何淑媚 指導教授：張文武 論文提要內容： 「跨業經營」是目前全球金融業的趨勢。我國政府鑑於我國金融業家數過多所產生過度競爭的弊端及因應全球金融市場自由化與國際化，於是於民國九十年六月二十七日通過「金融控股公司法」，首度允許金融業得兼營銀行、證券、票券及保險業，因此我國金融市場正掀起一系列整合活動。本文採用事件研究法，檢驗我國金融控股公司的設立對「金控主體企業」、「金控子公司」股價異常報酬的反應，並檢驗競爭對手公司究竟是符合「訊號發射效果」或是「競爭效果」。本文以「二個事件，三個宣告及三天期累積異常報酬」檢驗我國金融控股公司事件宣告之訊號發射對我國金融產業的影響。實證結果如下，「宣告成立金控公司之首次見報日」方面，「金控主體企業及金控子公司」在事件期均有正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，但没有顯著；競爭對手方面，銀行業及保險業在事件期有正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，但没有顯著；證券業在事件期有顯著正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，支持「訊號發射假說」；票券業在事件期有顯著正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，支持「訊號發射假說」。 「記者會宣告成立金控公司」方面，「金控主體企業、金控子公司」事件期均有顯著正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬；競爭對手方面，銀行業、證券業及票券業在事件期均有正向標準化累積平均異常報酬，但没有顯著；保險業在事件期有負向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，但没有顯著。金控公司宣告「換股比例」方面，「金控主體企業及金控子公司」，在事件期均有顯著正向標準化累積平均異常報酬；競爭對手方面，銀行業在事件期有顯著負向的標準化累積平均異常報酬，支持「競爭假說」；證券業、保險業及票券業在事件期均有正向的標準化累積平均異常報酬,但没有顯著。[[abstract]]Title of Thesis：Information-Signaling and Competitive Effects of Establish--ment of the Financial Holding Company in Taiwan.Key words：Financial Holding Company; Event study method; Rivals; Information-signaling effects; Competitive effects.Name of Institute：Graduate Institute of Management Sciences, Aletheia Graduate Date：June, 2003 Degree Conferred：MasterName of Student：Shu-Mei Ho Advisor：Wen-Wu Chang 何淑媚 張文武Abstract： 「Cross-selling」is the trend of the worldwide financial markets. Due to overly competitive and following the deregulation and internationalization of the worldwide financial. We passed “the Law of Bank Holding Company” in June 27, 2001. This research uses the Event Study method, three event announcements and three days cumulative average abnormal returns explores whether the finance market is in response to establishment of the Financial Holding announcements. Does the rivals to conform to the information-signaling hypothesis or competitive hypothesis？. For first announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive standardized cumulative average abnormal returns but insignificancy. For rivals, banks, insurance have insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. Security and facility have positive and significant cumulative average abnormal returns, which support the information-signaling hypothesis. For second announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive significant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. For rivals, banks, security, facility have insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. Insurance have negative insignificant cumulative average abnormal returns. For third announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive significant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. For rivals, banks have negative significant cumulative average abnormal returns, which support the competitive hypothesis. The security, insurance, facility have positive insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns