Contains fulltext : 150335.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expected to replace traditional accountability instruments in NPM reforms. We test this expectation by looking at the accountability arrangements of semi-autonomous agencies as a typical example of NPM reforms. Our findings are based on survey data on 342 agencies in six countries. We identify four types of accountability arrangements in semi-autonomous agencies, in line with the four trajectories of public management reform identified by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). Accountability relations between agencies and ministries are determined by country-specific ad...
Accountability to political principals, stakeholders and citizens is a major issue in the literature...
Forces of globalisation and localisation are inducing national governments to shift many tasks upwar...
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hie...
New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expe...
New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expe...
This paper starts with a theoretical discussion on the relationship between performance and accounta...
Defence date: 5 July 2011Examining Board: Prof. Peter Mair, European University Institute Prof. M...
Contains fulltext : 176121.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)This article ...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives i...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’chief executives in...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives i...
This paper develops and applies the concept of accountability styles for analyzing and comparing acc...
hand, and the extent to which agencies show features of the so-called ideal type of NPM-agencies: st...
Summary. — This paper examines how accountability is practiced by nongovernmental organizations (NGO...
Over the last thirty years, the public sector has been characterised by continuous upheavals and pr...
Accountability to political principals, stakeholders and citizens is a major issue in the literature...
Forces of globalisation and localisation are inducing national governments to shift many tasks upwar...
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hie...
New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expe...
New accountability instruments – performance indicators, audits, and financial incentives – are expe...
This paper starts with a theoretical discussion on the relationship between performance and accounta...
Defence date: 5 July 2011Examining Board: Prof. Peter Mair, European University Institute Prof. M...
Contains fulltext : 176121.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)This article ...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives i...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’chief executives in...
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives i...
This paper develops and applies the concept of accountability styles for analyzing and comparing acc...
hand, and the extent to which agencies show features of the so-called ideal type of NPM-agencies: st...
Summary. — This paper examines how accountability is practiced by nongovernmental organizations (NGO...
Over the last thirty years, the public sector has been characterised by continuous upheavals and pr...
Accountability to political principals, stakeholders and citizens is a major issue in the literature...
Forces of globalisation and localisation are inducing national governments to shift many tasks upwar...
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hie...