In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015
In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of t...
We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity...
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition ...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of t...
We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity...
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition ...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of t...
We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
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