Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been justified because they release public funds or save on d...
This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as well as t...
Public-private partnerships (PPP) allow involvement of private parties in the provision of public go...
Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and ...
Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of differ...
This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure ...
We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Part...
Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is incre...
Rising use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructu...
Globally, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have increased in popularity as an alternative procurem...
The paper analyzes the service provision of infrastructure from the aspect of demand risk sharing. ...
This article focuses primarily on analyzing the possible relation between infrastructure management ...
Building upon Iossa and Martimort (2008), we study the main incentive issues and the form of optimal...
We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of ...
Abstract: This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as...
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been justified because they release public funds or save on d...
This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as well as t...
Public-private partnerships (PPP) allow involvement of private parties in the provision of public go...
Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and ...
Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of differ...
This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure ...
We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Part...
Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is incre...
Rising use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructu...
Globally, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have increased in popularity as an alternative procurem...
The paper analyzes the service provision of infrastructure from the aspect of demand risk sharing. ...
This article focuses primarily on analyzing the possible relation between infrastructure management ...
Building upon Iossa and Martimort (2008), we study the main incentive issues and the form of optimal...
We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of ...
Abstract: This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as...
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been justified because they release public funds or save on d...
This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as well as t...
Public-private partnerships (PPP) allow involvement of private parties in the provision of public go...