A firm in a competitive environment, that is able to cheat consumers, wishes to maximize profits. This firm has a current incentive to cheat consumers to make additionally revenue. But if the firm builds a reputation for cheating it will not be able to charge as high a price for its product and consumers may avoid it. If firm reputations are sufficiently high there will be an equilibrium where the top firms hold a monopoly over the market and will never be forced to drop out. However, for lower firm reputations, firms are willing to produce in such a way that lower reputation firms may be able to join the cadre of top firms
Abstract. It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller’s ability in experience goods mar...
In the reputation model of Klein & Leffler (1981) firms refrain from cutting quality or price be...
This dissertation theoretically analyzes three topics in industrial organization. The first chapter ...
Trust and reputation systems are widely adopted in the e-commerce environment to help buyers choose ...
Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition may drive out of the market those firm...
This dissertation is an examination of the impact of dynamic consumer reputation effects on firm dec...
In online markets, a store’s reputation is closely tied to its profitability. Sellers ’ desire to qu...
Credence goods are products and services for which buyers are unable to observe the quality they req...
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
In this paper, we examine the application of electronic mar-ketplaces, populated by buying and selli...
Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition may drive out of the market those firm...
Problem to be Addressed Our research is within the subfield of modeling trust and reputation in mult...
We conducted a framed field experiment on eBay, and examined to what extent both social and competit...
Session 85: Topics in InformationThis paper investigates the e§ect of competition on the reputation ...
University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. August 2012. Major: Economics. Advisor:Patrick Bajari, T...
Abstract. It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller’s ability in experience goods mar...
In the reputation model of Klein & Leffler (1981) firms refrain from cutting quality or price be...
This dissertation theoretically analyzes three topics in industrial organization. The first chapter ...
Trust and reputation systems are widely adopted in the e-commerce environment to help buyers choose ...
Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition may drive out of the market those firm...
This dissertation is an examination of the impact of dynamic consumer reputation effects on firm dec...
In online markets, a store’s reputation is closely tied to its profitability. Sellers ’ desire to qu...
Credence goods are products and services for which buyers are unable to observe the quality they req...
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
In this paper, we examine the application of electronic mar-ketplaces, populated by buying and selli...
Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition may drive out of the market those firm...
Problem to be Addressed Our research is within the subfield of modeling trust and reputation in mult...
We conducted a framed field experiment on eBay, and examined to what extent both social and competit...
Session 85: Topics in InformationThis paper investigates the e§ect of competition on the reputation ...
University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. August 2012. Major: Economics. Advisor:Patrick Bajari, T...
Abstract. It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller’s ability in experience goods mar...
In the reputation model of Klein & Leffler (1981) firms refrain from cutting quality or price be...
This dissertation theoretically analyzes three topics in industrial organization. The first chapter ...