Demand Response Application by Strategic Wind Power Producers

This paper considers a wind power producer playing strategically in a day-ahead market while willing to set demand response (DR) contracts with a DR aggregator. To this end, a bilevel problem including a single leader and two followers is formulated. The wind power producer is the leader aiming at maximizing its profit through offering into a day-ahead market and clearing its deviation in a balancing market. The strategic behavior of the producer in the day-ahead market is modeled through the market clearing process (follower 1). In addition, the DR aggregator behavior is modeled through a revenue function in which the aggregator is able to sell its DR product to the wind power producer, other competitors and the day-ahead market (follower 2). The overall problem is a stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) in which wind power production and imbalance prices are associated with uncertainty. The problem is then transformed into a linear programming approach. A case of the Nordic market is chosen to assess the validity of the given problem