International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable case is much more difficult; whenever the number of strategies is finite (which is not necessarily the case, even when the state space is finite), the main tool for the exact solving is the construction of the full matrix game and its solving by linear programming. We here propose tools for approximating the value of partially observable games. The lemmas are relatively general, and we apply them for deriving rigorous bounds on the Nash equilibrium of phantom-tic-tac-toe and phantom-Go
International audienceWe show some mathematical links between partially observable (PO) games in whi...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
AbstractWe extend the well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute pure-strategy Bayesian-Na...
International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable ...
In many real-world problems, there is a dynamic interaction between competitive agents. Partially ob...
We propose an algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of partially observable games usin...
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some me...
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry prope...
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry prope...
We consider two-player zero-sum partial-observation stochastic games on graphs. Based on the informa...
International audienceWe investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy...
We study partially observable semi-Markov game with discounted payoff on a Borel state space. We stu...
We study partially observable semi-Markov game with discounted payoff on a Borel state space. We stu...
Repeated games with unknown payoff distributions are analogous to a single decision maker's "multi-a...
We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents engaged in an infinite horizon partially observable sto...
International audienceWe show some mathematical links between partially observable (PO) games in whi...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
AbstractWe extend the well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute pure-strategy Bayesian-Na...
International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable ...
In many real-world problems, there is a dynamic interaction between competitive agents. Partially ob...
We propose an algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of partially observable games usin...
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some me...
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry prope...
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry prope...
We consider two-player zero-sum partial-observation stochastic games on graphs. Based on the informa...
International audienceWe investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy...
We study partially observable semi-Markov game with discounted payoff on a Borel state space. We stu...
We study partially observable semi-Markov game with discounted payoff on a Borel state space. We stu...
Repeated games with unknown payoff distributions are analogous to a single decision maker's "multi-a...
We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents engaged in an infinite horizon partially observable sto...
International audienceWe show some mathematical links between partially observable (PO) games in whi...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
AbstractWe extend the well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute pure-strategy Bayesian-Na...