Executive-legislative relations and inter-parliamentary relations in federal systems: lessons for the European Union

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor and Francis via the DOI in this record.This paper examines the claim that the fusion between executive and parliamentary majority (that marks parliamentary regimes and thus most EU member states) makes the development of a proactive collective role of national parliaments as a political force in the European multilevel system unlikely – irrespective of growing attempts to formally empower national parliaments. Conditions for inter-parliamentary activism – defined as joint parliamentary activities that aim at enhancing parliaments’ political influence or interests in a multilevel polity – are critically examined by a comparative study of the nature of inter-parliamentary activities in three federal systems whose constituent units are characterized by most different executive-legislative relations. In line with theoretical expectations, inter-parliamentary activism is strongest in the US (separation of powers) and non-existent in Canada (parliamentarism), with Switzerland located in between (separation of powers bridged by party ties). With the EU being most similar to Canada when it comes to executive- legislative relations, the findings support those skeptical towards national parliaments’ potential to jointly become a politically active player in the EU.This research has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–13)/ERC grant agreement 335890 STATORG