Problem reprezentacije kod Gillesa Deleuzea i Wilfrida Sellarsa

The respective philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Wilfrid Sellars constitute two contrasting perspectives on the problem of representation. On the one hand, Deleuze’s entire philosophical system is founded upon his critique of representation and his quest for an “other knowledge”: an intuitive-creative kind of knowledge which gives us an immediate access to things by way of “singular concepts”, concepts appropriate to the very thing for which they were created. On the other hand, Sellars’ philosophical enterprise has been marked decidedly by his critique of “the myth of the given”, a critique of the very possibility of intuitive, immediate knowledge: knowledge can only be representative-normative, for Sellars, for, as he put it, to characterize an episode as knowledge is to place it in “the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” By contrasting Deleuze and Sellars with regards to the problem of representation, this dissertation is intent on highlighting the necessity of reopening the question of the possibility of representation, not only in philosophy and cultural theory, but in arts and literature as well