Intelligence in Aristotle\u27s Treatise On the Soul (De Anima) - Henry Kahl In his treatiseOn the Soul(DeAnima) Aristotle claims that human beings are the most intelligent of animals because they have the most precise sense of touch (DA2.9, 421a23). But he does not explain what it is about the sense of touch that makes humans so intelligent. Some commentators claim that our precise sense of touch makes us better at grasping concepts, which in turn makes us better reasoners. But in my paper, I argue that having a precise sense of touch does not make humans more rational. Rather, I claim that humans are the most intelligent of animals, according to Aristotle, because they are able to discriminate between objects of perception better than ot...
This dissertation offers an interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory of cognition by considering two ...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle’s De Anima: Advisor: Krisanna Scheiter Readers of A...
Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle’s De Anima: Advisor: Krisanna Scheiter Readers of A...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle is clearly aware that the theory of separable intellect is not without its own difficultie...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
This dissertation offers an interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory of cognition by considering two ...
This dissertation offers an interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory of cognition by considering two ...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle’s De Anima: Advisor: Krisanna Scheiter Readers of A...
Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle’s De Anima: Advisor: Krisanna Scheiter Readers of A...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Tou...
Aristotle is clearly aware that the theory of separable intellect is not without its own difficultie...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incor...
This dissertation offers an interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory of cognition by considering two ...
This dissertation offers an interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory of cognition by considering two ...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...
In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t...